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Michael J. Madison∗ 
This Essay is a rigorous and serious account of how the current economy of 
academic legal publishing thwarts efforts by authors and journals to supplant that 
economy via open access publishing and distribution models. Law professors, law 
schools, and universities generally like the system as it is. Instead, the Essay argues 
that open access models must complement that economy, rather than supplant it. 
 
 
This appears to be a paper about law reviews, which happens to be situated 
in a conversation about open access. It’s really a paper about open access, 
which happens to be situated in a conversation about law reviews. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The idea behind open access for scholarly publishing—that is, increasing 
the spread of what academics call “knowledge”—sounds like it should be self-
evidently good. But it’s not; or, at least when the idea is considered in isolation, 
we can’t tell. As a result, and although open access models are intended to 
make “knowledge” more widely available, any conversation about those 
models has to confront an important question: Who cares? Here I want to focus 
on open access for a specific brand of scholarship, that is, legal scholarship. In 
that context, the discussion of open access is complicated by the long and 
sensible criticism that law reviews are purveyors of turgid, vapid prose.1 Who 
cares about disseminating that, we might say, except, perhaps, law professors 
themselves? In this Essay, I take a stab at answering that question. 
Some scientific journals and academic scientists have taken steps along the 
open access path. By and large, academic lawyers have not. Yet asking why 
law reviews haven’t yet joined their scientific counterparts (the nominal 
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premise of this symposium) may put the proverbial cart before the horse. To 
ask about open access publishing for any scholarly domain is to ask about the 
very idea of scholarship in that domain. Open access for law reviews really 
invites a hard look at law reviews and legal scholarship in general. Instead of 
talking about the future of law review publishing, then, I want to talk a bit 
about its past. Law reviews and legal scholars have gotten along acceptably 
with the current system for well over a century. For them, the system has 
worked pretty well. The question isn’t so much why law reviews haven’t 
embraced change. The question for law reviews, as it might be for any 
scholarly institution, is why they should. 
The Essay explains how open access might be accommodated in the only 
world that law reviews and legal scholars know. 
*** 
I wrote a first draft of this piece using the usual rituals and conventions of 
legal scholarship, and then I discarded it. The disclaimer is necessary for some 
nonobvious reasons. 
First, although I’m serious about my thesis, I really would like people to 
read this even outside the legal academy.2 Along the way, I sacrifice some 
nuance, and occasionally some scholarly sobriety, in favor of narrative interest 
and readability. 
Second, form aside, I have a broader point about substance. An abstract 
case for open access for law reviews doesn’t make sense. Understanding the 
open access argument truly requires a discussion of the conceptual foundations 
of the publishing domain where the argument arises. The same principle applies 
to any other scholarly discipline and, for that matter, to any kind of published 
work. The title of the piece is a bit of misdirection; when we consider open 
access in any context, we’re holding a concept of a scholarly domain up to the 
light of a publishing aspiration. “Open Access” in this context really requires 
investigating “The Idea of the Law Review.” There is a concept of “the law 
review” that law professors have carried around in their heads, more or less 
consistently, for decades. I need to talk about what that is before I can talk 
about whether open access for law reviews is a good thing, why the reviews are 
reluctant to go down that path, and ultimately how to think about open access 
in general. To do that, I need to step just outside my usual scholarly role. 
Third, I don’t claim that I’m the first person or that this is the first piece to 
make the claims that follow.3 So, this piece doesn’t track some conventions of 
 
2 The title is a holdover from that earlier concept, which draped a deconstruction of the 
various traditional and modern purposes of law reviews over an intellectual framework 
borrowed from JAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE IDEA OF THE UNIVERSITY: A REEXAMINATION 
(1992), in conversation with JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY (Frank M. 
Turner ed., Yale Univ. Press 1996) (1852). Pelikan argues that an institution derives its 
character from the ideas—plural—that precede it, and he evaluates the modern research 
university accordingly. See PELIKAN, supra, at 24. 
3 See Rob Kling & Geoffrey McKim, Scholarly Communication and the Continuum of 
Electronic Publishing, 50 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 890 (1999); Rob Kling, Lisa 
B. Spector & Joanna Fortuna, The Real Stakes of Virtual Publishing: The Transformation of 
E-Biomed into PubMed Central, 55 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 127 (2004). Cf. 
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“good” legal scholarship. While legal scholars are supposed to give the answer 
away before the argument begins, I don’t want to do that. I will give away the 
following, however: As I wrote in the very first sentence of this Essay, what is 
the text of my discussion and what is the context, or what is field and what is 
ground, can easily be mistaken. 
II. 
Before I get to the idea of the law review, I’ll start with open access 
publishing in general. “Open access” means an arrangement under which a 
journal allows its authors to self-publish their articles on freely-accessible 
websites or to post those articles in freely-accessible “open access” archives.4 
The point is to make the content more widely accessible, so that more people 
can read it. Academic writing is “knowledge,” in scholars’ conventional if 
somewhat self-aggrandizing understanding, and our duty as scholars is to 
promote the dissemination of knowledge for the good of humanity. If that’s the 
baseline, though, then it really isn’t so clear right away why open access is a 
good thing. There are perfectly respectable commercial publishers out there, 
and their owners and employees need to eat, and when they do their jobs 
properly, scholarly articles find their way into the journals, the journals find 
their way into the hands of paying customers, and the customers put them away 
on shelves and commercial databases where they are almost universally ignored 
by everyone—except other scholars. Open access doesn’t necessarily mean that 
existing scholarship gets read more, or that more scholarship gets read in the 
first place. It simply means that more scholarship is out there, and that existing 
scholarship is out there more, but that none of the work is necessarily any more 
visible that what we see today. Rob Kling and Geoffrey McKim made this 
point in simple terms when they observed that scholarly publication serves 
three functions: Making the work accessible, publicizing the work, and 
endorsing the work as trustworthy.5 Open access helps with the first problem, 
but not (necessarily) the other two. 
All of this applies in spades to law reviews, which offer the paradigm for 
what law professors call legal scholarship. And legal scholarship in the law 
reviews adds complications to the general academic publishing picture. As 
every law professor, lawyer, and judge in the world knows, legal scholarship in 
the American law reviews tends to be even more impenetrably jargon-filled 
than ordinary academic writing. It tends to be much, much longer than ordinary 
scholarship (that is, journal writing by every other academic discipline), and 
 
Paul Duguid, The Social Life of Legal Education: First Impressions, FIRST MONDAY, Sept. 
2002, http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue79/duguid/index.html (noting that sometimes 
less access to legal literature is more consistent with the institution’s overall socializing 
function). 
4 Like a lot of phrases in contemporary information policy debates, “open access” 
means slightly different things to different people. Since Dan Hunter was the first person to 
put the topic on the table in connection with legal journals, I adopt his definition. Dan 
Hunter, Walled Gardens, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 607, 617 (2005). 
5 See Kling & McKim, supra note 3. 
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(most important) it often has little to do with what real lawyers are interested 
in, which is making a living.6 This little rhetorical excess aside, realistically, 
law professors know that few people outside of law schools actually read the 
law reviews. They also know that even within law schools, a lot of law review 
writing isn’t read very much, and only those faculty members with a certain 
idealistic bent, those without tenure, and those who are members of tenure and 
promotion committees seem to take the material seriously on anything 
approaching a regular basis. 
That last paragraph consists of the usual indictment of law reviews, and 
that indictment seems to have little to do with publishing models per se, or with 
open access in particular. But the most important complication that legal 
scholarship adds to the usual journal publishing story isn’t the fact that the 
substance, by and large, is irrelevant to the condition of the world at large. The 
most important complication is the fact that virtually every law professor and 
judge in America has free desktop access to law review literature via 
comprehensive commercial databases (Westlaw and LexisNexis). Almost every 
law review is published by a law school, which finances a significant portion of 
its production costs,7 and almost every law review is edited by law students. 
Hard copies of each issue are distributed via subscription, mostly to law 
libraries, and electronic copies are distributed to commercial databases in 
exchange for royalties. Most of the publishing process, however, is completely 
hidden from most law review readers, who directly pay little or nothing for the 
privilege of reading. For other academic disciplines, commercial publishing has 
the significant drawback of making it really expensive for scholars to get access 
to what’s happening in their fields. Open access reduces the cost of access 
dramatically, whether or not it encourages scholars to read the work. In law, 
scholars already have ready access to their colleagues’ work. And they still 
don’t read it. What’s the point of making the work . . . free? 
So there’s the dilemma in a nutshell. What’s the difference between the 
system as we find it—scholarship written by scholars for scholars, and made 
available for free in online commercial databases that are entirely subsidized by 
our institutional employers8—and the open access system that we hypothesize 
 
6 Oops; I mean, pursuing justice and solving their clients’ problems. See, e.g., Harry T. 
Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Richard A. Posner, Against the Law Reviews, LEGAL AFFAIRS, 
Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 57, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/November-
December-2004/review_posner_nov0604.msp. For a less critical view from the bench, see 
Kenneth F. Ripple, The Role of the Law Review in the Tradition of Judicial Scholarship, 57 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 429 (2000), available at http://www.nyu.edu/pubs/annualsurvey/ 
html/issue.php?issueID=8. 
7 As Jessica Litman’s contribution to this symposium observes, one law school 
subsidizes the production of the journal itself; the authors’ law schools subsidize the 
production of the journal’s content. Jessica Litman, The Economics of Open Access 
Publishing, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 779, 789-90 (2006). 
8 The subsidy may be deeper. It’s plausible to assume that law schools aren’t paying 
full freight for their students and faculty, and that academic access is subsidized by high 
rates paid by practitioners, which are often passed on to their clients. Thanks to Joe Miller 
for this observation. 
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we’re missing? My first cut at the problem suggests that the difference is—
nothing. 
III. 
There has to be more here than meets the eye, and there is, but to describe 
it I have to step even farther outside my scholarly role. I have to adopt a pose. 
To get from a premise that doubts open access to a conclusion that law reviews 
may not need it, I need a theory. I’m going to adopt a clever heuristic device 
and argue that it solves the problem and explains the universe, and I’m going to 
borrow it from some non-legal field that I declare to be relevant. I’m going to 
do this at such an abstract level that the result is unverifiable and probably 
unrepeatable. This is, of course, precisely the sort of undisciplined cross-
disciplinary borrowing by a would-be legal “scholar” that practicing lawyers 
and non-lawyer academics criticize: Is this scholarship? Legal scholarship? 
Fortunately, I already have tenure. 
The keys to the kingdom, the solution to Hilbert’s Tenth Problem, the 
answer to the curious incident of the dog in the night time, is the following 
phrase: The economy of prestige. Law professors, law reviews, law schools, 
and law students think they have it (prestige, that is). They suspect that open 
access is going to take it away. The seemingly endless, bitter criticism of law 
reviews has the paradoxical effect of validating the current system. Challenging 
law reviews to subscribe to an open access norm, because that will make both 
scholars themselves and the world better off than they are now, may even be 
counterproductive. Let me explain. 
The “economy of prestige” isn’t my phrase, it isn’t my idea, and this isn’t 
the first time that anyone has tried to explain legal scholarship in symbolic 
terms.9 Julius Getman wrote that research serves as a “dress suit for academic 
elitism.”10 There is, however, a method to my apparent madness. The precise 
phrase “economy of prestige” comes from the field of something called cultural 
studies, and it’s the title of a recent book by James English, who teaches 
English at the University of Pennsylvania.11 English looks at criticisms of 
literary prizes, which are frequently the targets of derision by supporters of 
writers who have been snubbed, and he puzzles over why the prizes persist, and 
are so highly valued, despite the criticism. I care about what English has to say, 
but if I had to explain the whole thing, then this piece would be even longer 
than it is already.12 Instead, I’d rather borrow from the review of English’s 
 
9 Or in economic terms directly. See George L. Priest, Triumphs or Failings of Modern 
Legal Scholarship and the Conditions of Its Production, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 725 (1992). 
10 JULIUS GETMAN, IN THE COMPANY OF SCHOLARS: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION 43 (1992). 
11 JAMES ENGLISH, THE ECONOMY OF PRESTIGE: PRIZES, AWARDS, AND THE 
CIRCULATION OF CULTURAL VALUE (2005). 
12 If you must know, English’s theory can be distilled into the concept that the tools of 
economic understanding can be applied (evoking and invoking Bourdieu) to fields of 
symbolic cultural production. The result is the sort of thing that Robert Merton praised as a 
theory of “the middle range”: 
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book by Louis Menand, himself a Harvard professor. Menand sums up 
English’s analysis this way: 
[English’s] theory is that when people make these objections to the nature 
of prizes [objections based on the idea that they really aren’t all that 
important] they are helping to sustain a collective belief that true art has 
nothing to do with things like politics, money, in-group tastes, and 
beating out the other guy. As long as we want to believe that creative 
achievement is special, that a work of art is not just one more commodity 
seeking to aggrandize itself in the marketplace at the expense of other 
works of art, we need prizes so that we can complain about how stupid 
they are.13 
Now it’s not important to my argument whether Menand has English’s 
theory precisely right or not; for now, the summary is close enough, and I’ll 
call it Menand’s theory. My point is that Menand’s theory explains just about 
everything that we need to understand about why law review publishing works 
the way it does, why open access hasn’t set the law review world on fire, and 
even why we’re seeing blogging, shorter commentaries in online versions of 
the reviews, and so on. 
When it comes to law reviews, the first part of the economy of prestige 
should be obvious to law professors. We believe that we’re the most important 
part of the legal profession.14 More important than legislators, more important 
than judges, and much more important than actual practicing lawyers. This 
follows from a few commonplace observations. First, legislators, judges, and 
lawyers complain all the time that law professors don’t write articles that matter 
to the real world of the law. And law professors don’t care. They’re too busy 
articulating the background assumptions of the law, reconceptualizing the law 
in terms of theories borrowed from other fields, and pointing out that you can’t 
be a real lawyer (or at least an effective lawyer) without situating your client’s 
position in its theoretical context.15 Second, law professors invented law school 
 
On the one hand, we have various forms of close reading, in which one work or a small 
handful of individual works of art are meant to yield up a wealth of knowledge and 
insight through the sheer genius of the artist and/or ingenuity of the critic. On the other 
hand, we have various attempts to survey and pronounce upon the circumstances and 
trajectories of cultural life as a whole, based on general theories of cultural production 
and consumption and broad assessments of national or global trends. What’s left out is 
the whole middle-zone of cultural space, a space crowded not just with artists and 
consumers but with bureaucrats, functionaries, patrons, and administrators of culture, 
vigorously producing and deploying such instruments as the best-of list, the film 
festival, the artists’ convention, the book club, the piano competition. 
Id. at 12. Cf. ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 39 (enlarged ed. 
1968). 
13 Louis Menand, All That Glitters: Literature’s Global Economy, NEW YORKER, Dec. 
26, 2005 & Jan. 2, 2006, at 136. 
14 Cf. GETMAN, supra note 10, at 43 (“Research . . . [clothes] with respectability the 
attitudes that the academic enterprise is more important, demanding, and complex than other 
endeavors and that first-rate academics are different, smarter, and more creative than other 
people.”). 
15 Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the “Middle Ground,” 91 MICH. L. REV. 
2075 (1993). 
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(that’s true),16 and that means that they invented lawyers (mostly true, since 
lawyers all graduated from law school). To some of us, I suspect that it means 
that law professors invented law.17 Third, it’s a lot harder to get a job as a law 
professor than it is to get a job as a lawyer. Almost anyone with enough money 
and three years of endurance can get a law degree and hang out a shingle. 
Nowadays, even getting a job as a law professor requires writing at least one 
law review article. Enough said. 
Legislators, judges, and practicing lawyers undoubtedly don’t agree with 
law professors on this, but I have to take a moment to point out why this 
matters. If law professors aren’t the most important part of the legal profession 
(or at least if they don’t believe they are, which may be more important) pretty 
much all of the rest of my argument falls apart, and I still have more than 5,000 
words to go. But I think that the premise holds up. If law professors aren’t 
fundamentally concerned with professional prestige, then they should be 
perfectly happy to publish “scholarship” that mimics Continuing Legal 
Education seminars and provides a direct and obvious service to practicing 
lawyers everywhere. A few law professors do that, and do it happily, but the 
vast majority do not. 
Step two is really just some elaboration of the premise, so it’s a half-step, 
or perhaps a couple of quarter-steps. The first piece is this. Not only do law 
professors believe that they are the most important part of the legal profession, 
but they believe that they are just as important as professors in other schools 
and departments in the university.18 Now it’s easy to see why law professors 
have to be the most important members of the legal profession, because if they 
were less important than judges, say, they could never be as important as 
economics professors or academic art historians, who are at least as important 
as their non-academic colleagues. And it’s key to my argument that law 
professors are as important as economics professors and academic art historians 
because those folks get tenure, which is lifetime job security, and not even law 
firm partners get that any more.19 How do those folks get tenure? How do law 
professors keep their position alongside fellow faculty and at the top of 
professional heap? How do legal scholars reap the prestige that is so obviously 
their due? By publishing their work in scholarly journals. 
The second piece is a bit of amateur ontology. How do we know that law 
reviews are scholarly journals? The answer is that they’re scholarly journals 
because law schools say so. Law schools have long enjoyed saying so. The law 
review as an academic enterprise was created, like so many things, by faculty 
and students at Harvard Law School, and it flourished in the late 19th and early 
 
16 ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO 
THE 1980S (1983). 
17 This isn’t the place for a jurisprudential debate, but “what is the nature of law?” is a 
question that has occupied a lot of law review pages. 
18 Note that Getman’s sartorial summary of research isn’t limited to law. 
19 Judges do, but judges often believe that law professors believe that law professors 
are more important than judges. Perhaps more than anything else, that explains the 
occasional burst of judicial hostility toward legal scholarship. See Edwards, supra note 6. 
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20th centuries as law schools came to adopt the “Harvard model” (which 
included both the case method of classroom instruction and publication of a 
scholarly journal) as a route to respectability.20 
Step three is to set these parts in motion, that is, to explain how law 
reviews are scholarly journals because law schools say so. Describing the 
workings of the economy of prestige requires, in short, that I unbundle “law 
schools” into some subparts. (“Unbundle” is a word that appeals to law-and-
economics scholars. Critical scholars can substitute the word “deconstruct.” 
Mere mortals can read it as “This is what that phrase means.”) 
One subpart is the faculty. Legal journals are scholarly journals because 
“scholars” say so, and faculty members at law schools are, to use the circular 
reasoning that the prestige theory depends on, legal scholars. 
A second subpart is the students. Legal journals are scholarly journals 
because law students say so, especially, but not exclusively, the student editors 
of the law review. Student editors need the law review credential for the job 
market, and non-members of the review need to criticize the irrelevance of the 
review in order to validate its importance within the student body. Students and 
alumni also need the imputed prestige of the law review because law school 
prestige and law review prestige are closely correlated, and student perceptions 
of law school quality, and decisions on which school to attend, are closely 
correlated with law school prestige. The better the law review, the better the 
law school, and vice versa. Of course, students aren’t the only parts of the 
economy that benefit from this association. 
A third subpart is the university. The university obviously isn’t a subpart 
of the law school, but I call it a subpart of “the law school” as an institutional 
player, because for my purposes the law school plays the dominant role in 
validating law reviews as scholarly, and the university generally plays a 
secondary role. Legal journals are scholarly journals because academic units 
within a university publish scholarship, and a university would be pretty 
ashamed to discover that tenured faculty were producing a newspaper.  
Let me talk about each of those subparts for a paragraph or so. Where does 
this lead, and how do we know that the description is on the mark? As a bit of 
foreshadowing, here’s a tip: Look for the criticism of the reviews as useless 
hunks of parchment. That’s a signal that they’re worth something. 
An economy is a means of producing things. What does the economy of 
prestige produce, especially for law professors themselves? As authors, they get 
the prestige of branding by the schools whose reviews publish their work. That 
branding feeds further branding by their own institutions, which validate this 
form of publishing via tenure and promotion reviews. Both forms of prestige 
circulation feed and are fed by colleagues in other schools, who recognize and 
respond to scholarship by praising publication in “higher quality” law 
reviews.21 “Higher quality,” of course, refers largely to the “quality” of the 
 
20 See STEVENS, supra note 16, at 118 n.34, 157 n.13, 191. 
21 Despite the many and obvious flaws of an article selection system that puts authority 
in the hands of law students, authors take pride in being published in a “top 10” journal or a 
“top 20” journal, on the implied premise that the student editors who select the manuscripts 
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faculty, and the “quality” of the faculty is largely gauged (not to say measured) 
by its scholarship, which is gauged largely by its placement in law reviews. 
I assume, by the way, that there is something that we can talk about 
coherently as “legal scholarship,” even though outside the law schools, pretty 
much everyone in the academy knows that what law professors do can’t really 
be called “scholarship” because there are no quality standards, and (aside from 
a few quirky journals) there is no peer review, and that means that most 
everything that shows up in legal journals is badly-researched, badly-written, 
and badly-argued. But those objections are mistaken. 
Why? Because the rituals of scholarship, including its murkiness, define 
scholarship itself. Scholarship is what scholars exchange with one another, 
which means that scholarship is what shows up in scholarly publications, 
despite (or perhaps because of) the scholarly obligation to disseminate 
“knowledge” beyond the walls of the academy.22 Legal scholars, like other 
scholars, care most of all about what other scholars think of their work and not 
nearly so much about what other lawyers or judges, let alone “the public,” think 
of the work. Scholars of all stripes write primarily for each other.23 Criticism of 
the forms and rituals of scholarship simply reinforces its scholarly character. 
I can generalize the point: Legal scholars most of all love being part of 
The Academy. Being part of The Academy means that everyone thinks that 
you’re a scholar. Some law professors claim that they’re trying to find truth and 
meaning in the world so that they can improve the pursuit of justice.24 That 
proposition is appealing, at least at first, since legal professors usually are 
lawyers too, which means that we subscribe to the norms of the legal profession 
as a whole. By setting out the proposition for contrast I don’t intend to 
disrespect its adherents. But since everyone knows that no one really reads 
legal scholarship, they can’t really mean that, at least not all of the time. If your 
mission is to save the world, there are better things to do with your time than 
write law review articles.25 
If that’s right, then practitioner criticism of law reviews just misses the 
point entirely. Law reviews aren’t supposed to help practicing lawyers solve 
their clients’ problems. (If law professors really wanted to spend as much time 
on clients as they spend on law review articles, they would be practicing 
lawyers themselves, and then most of them would make much more money.) 
Ray Stanz once said, “Personally, I liked the University. They gave us money 
 
for publication are wise in proportion to the overall prestige ascribed to their law school 
and/or to their university. 
22 See PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 121–33. 
23 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Listeners and Eavesdroppers: Substantive Legal Theory and 
Its Audience, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 569 (1992); Judith Kaye, One Judge’s View of Academic 
Law Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313 (1989). 
24 See Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327 (2002); Jeffrey 
S. Brand, Law Schools and the Pursuit of Justice, 37 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 13 (2005). 
25 See Robert C. Post, Legal Scholarship and the Practice of Law, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 
615, 624–25 (1992) (noting the intractable tensions between the scholarly tradition of law 
faculty situating themselves inside the profession and their desire to explore forms of 
scholarship that are external to the law itself). 
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and facilities, we didn’t have to produce anything. . . . [Y]ou don’t know what 
it’s like out there. I’ve worked in the private sector. They expect results.”26 Ray 
was a Ghostbuster, but he had a wise soul. As writers, we’re scholars, which 
means (and I say this in the best possible sense) that we’re here to talk amongst 
ourselves. The application of the work comes through our teaching, and 
through our teaching to our students, and via our students into the world at 
large. 
The mechanisms of professorial prestige for law faculty can be elaborated 
in more detail. Long articles on obscure topics get published under the imprint 
of an academic institution, almost always one that’s attached to a real 
university. Law professors have few professional or learned societies to publish 
their work, so if you want to be treated as a “scholar” in law, you only have so 
many choices. One is to submit articles to peer-reviewed journals. In terms of 
manufacturing prestige, peer-reviewed publishing works pretty well, but there 
aren’t many peer-reviewed journals for legal scholarship, and that limits their 
potential as prestige suppliers.27 A second is to publish books. Like peer-
reviewed publishing, book publishing usually marks quality and well-branded 
scholarship in most academic fields, but it doesn’t work so well in law, even 
though once upon a time “scholarship” in “books” was a respectable activity 
for law professors. The problem is that the traditional form of book-based legal 
scholarship is the treatise, and the treatise is the kind of scholarship that doesn’t 
count for tenure and promotion as much as it used to. Treatises on the law are 
wonderful and useful things if you’re a practicing lawyer, but they aren’t so 
helpful if you’re a scholar, that is, a fellow traveler in search of The Truth. By 
definition, now that law professors have all thoroughly internalized the lessons 
of the Legal Realists, we’re skeptical when we’re told that someone else (that 
is, a treatise writer) has synthesized and rationalized the cases and in the 
process (implicitly) found The Truth. The law is intersubjective and 
constructed. Our job as scholars is to discern the social and cultural and 
economic relations hidden amid conventional legal forms. So we’re hardly 
likely to validate The Truth as “scholarship.” As authors, we’d rather engage in 
the search; as faculty reviewing our colleagues’ work for tenure, we want to 
validate the search; and as colleagues, we want to praise those whose methods 
succeed in the law review selection sweepstakes. In the latter two contexts, 
there but for the grace of God go I. In the former context, of course, there I go. 
Or more simply put: What goes around, comes around. 
Even law books that aren’t treatises, by the way, don’t feed the prestige 
economy so well, even though English professors and history professors write 
books, and they’re authentic scholars. Academic books are usually published 
by university presses, which offer genuine academic branding in all of the 
senses that I just mentioned. For law professors, though, that strategy won’t do, 
because they flatter their own field by arguing that the law changes, and 
sometimes it changes quickly. A medium that doesn’t evolve quickly (books 
 
26 The words were actually spoken by Dan Aykroyd. GHOSTBUSTERS (Sony Pictures 
1984). 
27 Scholars in other fields would concur. But they wouldn’t see this as a problem. 
  
2006] THE IDEA OF THE LAW REVIEW 911 
typically take a while to write and to publish) can’t handle the law, which we 
know is an incredibly dynamic thing. Moreover, monographs don’t lend 
themselves to use in the modified Socratic case method that dominates law 
school teaching. Scholarly journals, on the other hand, and especially journals 
published with little editorial scrutiny, are just the ticket for legal scholars. In 
theory, you can assemble an article on some novel point pretty quickly and get 
it published pretty quickly after that. Because these journals look a lot like 
journals in other fields (articles, periodic publishing, paper and binding), legal 
scholars can get the best of both worlds. They get the prestige of being 
published in something that has the brand of a university and the relative speed 
of being published in a journal. 
Not insignificantly, the system depends entirely on the mostly-free labor of 
a student editorial workforce. In fact, absolutely the worst thing about law 
review publishing, whether you’re a reader or a writer, is that the law students 
who select the articles and edit them are absolutely unqualified to do so. So 
much so that all kinds of drivel finds its way to print, including cross-
disciplinary and inter-disciplinary and non-disciplinary and just out-there kinds 
of things that no respectable scholarly journal in any other field would dare 
touch. From the students’ and law schools’ points of view, though, the great 
thing about the system is that for the most part, none of this matters. Law 
review membership is the traditional brass ring of the law school experience, 
the Golden Ticket, the top of the totem pole. It’s the signal that counts for 
future employers, whether those are law firms or judges or even law schools. 
Law review membership used to signal that someone was not only willing to 
work hard but had also learned something of substance about reading, writing, 
and analyzing the law. Harvard at one point considered the law review to be an 
extension of the case method of instruction.28 Some faculty even characterized 
it as a form of “clinical” education.29 Now, at many schools, membership is a 
signal mostly of itself. Most students now recognize the work as sheer 
drudgery, reading endless half-finished manuscripts submitted by professors, 
learning and applying the Bluebook (the most arcane rule-based system they 
ever encounter in the legal profession) and, for a few, writing up an analysis of 
a recent case that few know and fewer will ever remember. 
The essence of this system, remember, is the same thing that keeps law 
professors submitting their work to the reviews. Getting onto the law review 
originally meant top academic performance, so in a sense being an editor was 
double-dipping at the employment trough. But the imprint of the university, 
validating the double-dipping, was important. Most law professors were 
members of their own law reviews. Would that experience have been equally 
 
28 See STEVENS, supra note 16, at 118 n.34 (citing KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE 
BUSH (1930)). 
29 See id. at 215 n.88 (citing Alan W. Mewett, Reviewing the Law Reviews, 8 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 188 (1955), and David F. Cavers, In Advocacy of the Problem Method, 43 COLUM. L. 
REV. 449 (1943)). 
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important if the journal had been named the “New Haven Law Review”?30 
Students aren’t really scholars, but they can more or less pretend to be because 
they hang around stacks of scholarship in the law review offices, and the label 
makes the pretense stand up. “New Haven Law Review” doesn’t sell anything 
as part of the clerkship application; “Yale Law Journal” sells Yale, a company 
of scholars.31 Now that even the elite law reviews accept members from writing 
“competitions,” the fact that Review membership is a branding factory is all the 
more transparent. Like fully-footnoted manuscripts submitted by faculty 
authors, hard work by student editors is often in short supply, unless it’s 
motivated purely by pride, or less often, by fear. 
The economy of lawyers, scholars, and students inhabits and reacts to an 
institutional environment which is defined, first of all, by the university. The 
university, it’s reasonable to think, might wonder about the misuse of its name 
to support both a quasi-scholarly enterprise with a tenured faculty without 
terminal degrees and a segment of its student body that trades on the 
university’s scholarly reputation to get high paying jobs. The university, 
though, is hardly an innocent bystander. Langdell’s Harvard embraced a law 
review at precisely the time that Charles Eliot was trying to retool Harvard on 
the German research university model.32 Legal “science” and faculty 
scholarship were both clearly in tune with Eliot’s plan. In the process of seizing 
the scholarly high ground, the universities and the law schools were also able to 
seize control of the terms of legal debate, and to put their people on the cutting 
edge of the law in action.33 In a handful of cases, it’s not much of an 
exaggeration to say that a Harvard Law Review article did, indeed, create the 
law.34 Getting a Harvard Law Review article cited by the Supreme Court of the 
United States is the sort of thing that can go to your head. In fact, it may be just 
about the only thing that can briefly unsettle the belief that law professors are 
the most important members of the legal profession. Scholars don’t care so 
 
30 The University of Pennsylvania claims the oldest continuously published legal 
periodical in the U.S., since what is now the University of Pennsylvania Law Review started 
life in 1852 as the American Law Register. An ALR editor became dean of the law school in 
1896 and brought the journal with him, turning it over to students as editors. Outside of 
Philadelphia, however, Harvard’s is universally recognized as the “oldest” law review. See 
Michael I. Swygert & Jon W. Bruce, The Historical Origins, Founding, and Early 
Development of Student-Edited Law Reviews, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 739, 755–78 (1985). 
31 This phrase comes from GEORGE W. PIERSON, YALE: A SHORT HISTORY (1976). 
32 See STEVENS, supra note 16, at 270; Bernard J. Hibbitts, Last Writes? Reassessing 
the Law Review in the Age of Cyberspace, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 615, 626 (1996); John Henry 
Schlegel, Langdell’s Auto-da-fé, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 149, 153 (1999). 
33 See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 58–59 (1977) (describing the 
Harvard-model law review as a “massive intellectual achievement” that responded, in part, 
to the glut of legal information created by the rise of West’s National Reporter System). 
34 The canonical example of the influence of a piece of legal scholarship on the law 
itself is Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). A better descriptor of this article might be “isolated.” Few law review articles have 
had such a clear and lasting impact on the law. Even today scholars cite it along with a 
handful of other pieces as evidence of the practical significance of legal scholarship. Michael 
W. Carroll, The Movement for Open Access Law, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 741, 743 n.2 
(2006). 
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much about whether their stuff gets read by non-scholars, except when it does, 
and when it gets read by the Supreme Court (well, it gets read by the clerks, 
and professors are clearly more important than they are), not only do scholars 
care, but the rest of the university notices, too. 
Not that all of this “legal scholarship” is, or was, such a totally new thing 
from the standpoint of the university. In the German model, law had long been 
part of the university, because legal scholars were scholars and legal 
scholarship was “scholarship” like anything else.35 It was the English that did 
things the other way; the English trained lawyers. But the idea of training 
lawyers (what the English did) and the idea of housing scholars in universities 
(what the Germans did) didn’t come together in a single concept until the 
Americans figured it out at the end of the 19th century, at Harvard. The 
scholars needed the law reviews to justify staying in the American university; 
the lawyers needed the law reviews to justify being treated as scholars. That 
system is essentially the same system that we see today. When the university 
notices the oddity of the whole thing, it does just that: It notices the oddity, 
basks in the reflected benefits, and then the university largely leaves it alone.36 
Can I (in a Step Three) tie all of this together? I think so, but whether it 
really hangs as an argument is beyond me. But then I’m a law professor, and 
it’s not clear that this is scholarship. Instead, let me sum up. There are more 
actors and interests and institutions to specify, but the point should already be 
clear. The theory of the economy of prestige holds that we see a grumpily 
mutually-reinforcing symbolic economy of law professors, lawyers, law 
students, law schools and their universities processing professional prestige 
through the unusual institution known as the law review. 
Before I go back to what this has to do with open access and publishing, 
however, there is one more bridge to cross. 
IV. 
The economy of prestige sounds like a house of cards. And it is. We know 
this because almost everyone involved regularly complains that law reviews 
(and legal scholars) generally produce undisciplined and/or mediocre work and 
that such-and-such article either was much better than or worse than its 
placement. The most trenchant views come, not surprisingly, from Judge 
Posner: “Given the handicaps of ignorance, immaturity, inexperience, and 
inadequate incentives, the wonder is not that law reviews leave much to be 
desired as scholarly journals, but that they aren’t much worse than they are.”37 
The Harvard Law Review publishes lousy articles, and so-called fourth-tier law 
schools publish good ones. The student editors are uninformed judges of 
quality; they select pieces based on the author’s reputation, or based on the 
 
35 See PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 99–109. 
36 See Paul A. Samuelson, The Convergence of the Law School and the University, 44 
AM. SCHOLAR 256 (1974). 
37 Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Student-Edited Law Review, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
1131, 1132 (1995). 
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reputation of the author’s law school, or based on sexy but fleeting topics. 
Student editing typically makes articles worse. Doctrinal scholarship is 
uninspired. Interdisciplinary and cross-disciplinary labels are convenient cover 
for shoddy intellectual arguments that don’t meet standards of rigor in “real” 
academic departments. Judge Posner is writing about student editors, but there 
is much in his commentary that could be—and has been—addressed to faculty 
authors. 
Judge Posner is hardly alone, though he comes at the problem from an 
academic’s perspective. From the judicial perspective, his colleagues on the 
bench are equally unsparing.38 Even law professors themselves damn the 
system with faint praise; perhaps the best that we say about our own work is 
that we’re suffering from an identity crisis.39 Students are just as cutting in their 
criticism of the review system as faculty and judges are. At best, among other 
things, top tier students resent being used as unpaid research assistants by 
arrogant faculty authors and resent being blamed for their role in the law 
review system itself.40 At worst, they’re suffering the sins of their ancestors, 
that first group of law students who approached Dean Ames for permission to 
found the Harvard Law Review. 
Importantly, the theory of the economy of prestige has a place for these 
critiques. Not only do the criticisms not take hold, but they actually reinforce 
the current system. Law reviews need the criticism because it highlights the 
sense that the reviews have value in the first place. Menand writes: 
In an information, or “symbolic,” economy, in other words, the goods 
themselves are physically worthless: they are mere print on a page or 
code on a disk. What makes them valuable is the recognition that they are 
valuable. This recognition is not automatic and intuitive; it has to be 
constructed. A work of art has to circulate through a sub-economy of 
exchange operated by a large and growing class of middlemen: 
publishers, curators, producers, publicists, philanthropists, foundation 
officers, critics, professors, and so on. The prize system, with its own 
cadre of career administrators and judges, is one of the ways in which 
value gets “added on” to a work. Of course, we like to think that the 
recognition of artistic excellence is intuitive. We don’t like to think of 
cultural value as something that requires middlemen—people who are not 
artists themselves—in order to emerge. We prefer to believe that truly 
good literature or music or film announces itself. Which is another reason 
that we need prizes: so that we can insist that we don’t really need 
them.41 
 
38 See Edwards, supra note 6, at 36–37. 
39 See Post, supra note 25, at 615, 624–25 (describing the “demoralization” of legal 
scholarship); Todd D. Rakoff, Introduction, Symposium, Law, Knowledge, and the Academy, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 1278, 1279 (2002) (noting the multiple dimensions of debates about legal 
scholarship). 
40 See J.C. Oleson, You Make Me [Sic]: Confessions of a Sadistic Law Review Editor, 
37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135 (2004). 
41 Menand, supra note 13, at 137. See ENGLISH, supra note 11, at 197–216. 
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If you believe this, then what matters about the law review system is that 
the law schools sponsor the journals, and that the journals (or at least the article 
titles and attribution) get effectively communicated to other scholars. Nothing 
else matters much (not article quality, not selection mechanisms, not the way 
the articles are edited or how clearly they are written). So long as we freely 
criticize what the journals produce and how they produce it, almost everyone in 
legal academia will still want to get published in the Harvard Law Review.42 
Law professors have been pressing at the edges of this system by doing a 
variety of things that make it appear that they really do want an audience. Some 
law reviews have moved toward publishing more “commentaries” alongside 
full-blown articles,43 and toward doing at least some of this on the Internet. 
Law professors are blogging. They are posting manuscripts on online open 
access archives like the Legal Scholarship Network at the Social Science 
Research Network (SSRN), and via bepress. Some of the “elite” law reviews 
have formed a cartel to police the length of law review articles.44 There have 
been calls for faculty to reject the system of student-edited reviews and to 
publish with peer-reviewed journals,45 and through university presses.46 Not all 
of these things represent “scholarship” or moves toward improved 
“scholarship,” but there seem to be cracks in the law review foundation. What 
these really represent, I think, is not much more than ratification of the 
constructed-ness of the whole thing. Law reviews are the centers of the prestige 
economy precisely because of law professors’ anxiety over whether anything 
that we write actually matters. The more we chip away at the core of the 
system, the more we manifest that anxiety. The urgency of our implicit claim 
(“it’s shorter and easier to read, so please listen!”) only heightens the contrast 
between the new forms and traditional scholarship. It makes the latter that 
much more central to our scholarly standing. 
 
42 Virtually all of this extends to criticism of legal scholarship by scholars in other 
disciplines, who are appalled that the university grants tenure to people who don’t publish in 
peer-reviewed journals. Withdrawal of university sponsorship and/or a collapse of the 
implicit hierarchy of law review “quality” undoubtedly would lead over time to substantial 
withdrawal of the generalized acceptance of law schools in universities. Without university-
sponsorship for faculty scholarship, law schools would look uncomfortably like trade 
schools. 
43 Law reviews at Harvard, Yale, and Hofstra, among other law schools, have each 
recently begun to publish shorter and more timely commentaries and/or responses to 
“regular” scholarship. Harvard now publishes an online “Forum” (see Harvard Law Review 
Forum, About the Forum, http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/aboutforum.shtml). Yale 
publishes The Pocket Part online (see Yale Law Journal, The Pocket Part, 
http://www.thepocketpart.org/). Hofstra includes an “Ideas” section in its printed law review 
(see Hofstra Law Review, Ideas, http://www.hofstra.edu/Academics/Law/LawRev/ 
index_LawRev.cfm). 
44 For a cheerful view of this development, see Robert C. Berring, Less is More. Really, 
8 GREEN BAG 2d 231 (2005). 
45 See Posner, supra note 6, at 58. 
46 See Rosa Brooks, LawCulture, Goodbye to Law Reviews? (Jan. 17, 2006), 
http://lawculture.blogs.com/lawculture/2006/01/goodbye_to_law_.html. 
  
916 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:4 
V. 
In an important sense, debating why open access hasn’t made it to the law 
reviews is simply piling more criticism on an institution that’s been taking a 
beating for a good long while. And without doubt, some law review articles are 
“better” than others, often much better, and the better stuff generates prestige 
for the publishing review and its law school and even its university. The 
economy of prestige not only goes round and round, but it also goes back and 
forth. Here, though, I should turn my attention to what the economy of prestige 
has to do with open access, or more precisely, how the publication model 
matters. 
In the economy of prestige, something else has to happen between making 
something available to read and actually having it read. Professors, like most 
people, care about those two things in different degrees. I assume that most 
professors really, really like having scholarship (especially their own 
scholarship) available to read. I also assume that far fewer professors actually 
care about whether their scholarly work gets widely read. Read by colleagues, 
certainly, and when I say “colleagues,” I mean both current and aspirational 
colleagues (people we would like to know and/or work with) but not 
necessarily by anyone beyond that. The gap between distribution and 
consumption, so to speak, is filled by authority. Among those who read the 
work, it’s important that the work be authoritative, or at least credible. As Rob 
Kling observed, any scholarly publishing model has to account both for 
publicizing the work, and for declaring that the work is trustworthy. Merely 
making it accessible isn’t enough. 
In the old days of law reviews, before LexisNexis and Westlaw came 
along in the early 1980s, print publication and the imprint of the university-
based law school often served as both publicity and validation enough.47 In a 
related vein, Bob Berring has described the “cognitive authority” of the 
inherently limited circulation of other print-based legal literature: the National 
Reporter System, the West Digest System, and Shepard’s.48 Scholars of print 
have noted the inherently authoritative nature of “the book.” Traditional law 
reviews, like all scholarly publications, benefited accordingly. Once 
LexisNexis and Westlaw started putting full texts of law reviews on their 
databases, the authority of print started to recede, leaving the authority of the 
publisher and, to a lesser extent, the authority of limited access. A lot of law 
professors these days never actually handle original physical copies of law 
review articles, unless they’re stuffing envelopes with reprints to send out to 
colleagues. The patois of the professoriate long ago started to refer to 
 
47 See Hibbitts, supra note 32, at 616. 
48 See Robert C. Berring, Legal Information and the Search for Cognitive Authority, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 1673, 1692, 1695 (2000). Frederick Schauer describes the ambiguities inherent 
in the authority that we assign to legal scholarship and concludes that “legal scholarship may 
at times be treated as more authoritative than a perfectly rational decisionmaking 
environment would allow.” Frederick Schauer, The Authority of Legal Scholarship, 139 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1003, 1017 (1991). 
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placement of an article simply by the school name, that is, by the authority of 
the brand. “I’m publishing in NYU,” or “I’m publishing in Florida State,” is a 
perfectly comprehensible statement among legal scholars. 
The inherent limitations of print distribution meant that law review 
circulation built its own economy of prestige. Even for the Harvard Law 
Review, whose subscriber base far exceeds that of any of its scholarly peers, 
subscription created an aura of scholarly exclusivity. As a law student, I was a 
member of the law review at Stanford, and I remember more or less what I 
thought when I learned that a recent graduate of the law school had purchased 
an individual subscription to the Review: Man, that guy must be a serious 
intellectual! 
The commercial database model obviously can’t match that aura step-for-
step, since the databases include so much non-scholarly legal literature. 
Westlaw’s JLR database includes PLI and ALI-ABA course materials as well 
as the Yale Law Journal. But the relative exclusivity of the databases does have 
that effect. Pricing models differentiate between practitioners, on the one hand, 
and law schools and judges’ chambers, on the other. Practitioners often pay 
metered rates for access to the database; law schools pay a flat rate. Unlike 
practicing lawyers, law professors can search and use the databases at no 
marginal cost. It feels free. We’re inside the scholarly system again, and the 
rest of the world is outside.49 
What I described in the last Part as “cracks in the law review foundation” 
are tangible echoes of critiques of commercial publishing for scholarship. In the 
economy of prestige, and in terms of the publishing component of that 
economy, those cracks don’t reflect a breakdown of the economy so much as 
they reflect anxiety over its integrity. Law professor blogging is an effort to 
shore up the law review publishing model rather than an effort to undermine it, 
just as law faculty who post pre-prints (and post-prints) on SSRN and bepress 
are quick to defend the practice on the ground that it complements law review 
publication.50 Right now, open access for law review publishing is treated like 
bashing law reviews for publishing sloppily-edited, undisciplined work—as a 
justification for the status quo. 
What would happen to this economy of prestige if law reviews not only 
adopted open access publication policies but also pushed authors to publish 
their work in open access archives? Faculty would still submit their pieces to 
law reviews, have them selected, edited and formally published by law reviews, 
and then distribute their fully-edited articles on their own, for free, via their 
own websites or archives run by other people. What then? 
One possibility, and this is the possibility that I think worries most faculty 
who actually bother to think about it, is that this would end up cutting the law 
schools out of the publishing business entirely. Some people see this as a good 
 
49 Some law reviews post open access versions of their content on their websites, but 
until search mechanisms for scholarship on the Web become as easy to use as Lexis and 
Westlaw search engines, lack of publicity for open access versions means that they remain 
poor substitutes for commercialized versions. 
50 See Hunter, supra note 4, at 633. 
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thing. In 1996, as the Internet was first being recognized for its broad popular 
(and popularizing, disintermediating) potential, Bernard Hibbitts foretold legal 
scholars’ bypassing the law reviews and publishing their work directly online.51 
Ten years on, this hasn’t happened, which tells me that the economy of prestige 
is, in fact, an important part of the system. If open access is a stalking horse for 
this sort of thing, and if law reviews and law professors right now are making 
that kind of connection (that is, if we do this open access thing, why have a law 
review at all?), then it’s no surprise to find that law reviews and law professors 
haven’t jumped on board. They’ve got a good thing going, and they don’t see 
why they should put that at risk. It’s more than a massive collective action 
problem. Lots of faculty literally can’t see that open access will do them any 
good. Why undermine the institution that makes the economy of prestige hum? 
On the other hand, if open access leaves the law review system more or 
less as is, with everyone still sucking prestige out of the system as fast as new 
articles can be pushed in, then there’s no reason not to welcome it. The worst 
case scenario is that we end up with a lot of digital copies of things that no one 
reads. The best case is that someone figures out a way actually to get the useful 
material into the hands of the people who need it. Open access gets hitched to 
publicity and quality-validation mechanisms that, in tandem, re-create the 
economy of prestige. 
VI. 
Those two possibilities sketch a kind of open access “innovator’s 
dilemma.” That phrase belongs to Clayton Christensen, at the Harvard Business 
School.52 The innovator’s dilemma is a management problem. Classic “good” 
management, over time, tends to focus on products and services that enhance 
the firm’s classic mission, or what Christensen calls “sustaining” technologies. 
Over time, firms that focus on sustaining technologies do so rationally, and 
they ultimately get knocked aside by firms that invest in “disruptive” 
technologies, that is, in paradigm shifting products and services that start out in 
niche markets but end up as category killers. The innovator’s dilemma is that 
good managers have no incentive to invest in disruption, so they don’t. Good 
companies die as a result. 
Since the economy of prestige borrows the vocabulary of markets, it seems 
altogether appropriate to borrow another tool from the business toolbox. Open 
access, with its threat to scholars’ economy of prestige, is perceived as a 
potentially disruptive technology. (Perceived by whom? It’s fair to ask. The 
answer, of course, is “everyone.”) No one can know whether marginalizing 
open access will lead to the catastrophic failure of the current, dominant 
publishing and prestige model. But Christensen’s work does offer a way to 
limit the downside risk. Christensen has a series of prescriptions for managers 
who want to capture disruptive technologies. The one that seems to have the 
 
51 See Hibbitts, supra note 32, at 668. 
52 See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1997). 
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most traction, both in his work and beyond, is locating development of 
disruptive technologies in organizations and places that are distinct from the 
basic firm framework. New city, new building, no organizational ties; don’t 
make it a profit center; let new ideas fail and grow on small scales and build 
customer demand from the outside. 
How might law reviews (and legal scholars, and law schools, and 
universities) do that? How can the legal scholars’ economy of prestige capture 
the potential value of a disruptive open access model? Here’s a sketch of a 
proposal for how to make that work by building a structure that allows the 
disruptive model to get a foothold and grow. 
Open access publishing can be part of a working prestige economy if 
scholarly publication is standardized to a format that permits scholars in 
relevant disciplines to develop a digital “tagging” specification that can be read 
by Internet search engines and other online communications tools. Works in 
open access archives could be labeled electronically, that is, tagged, classified, 
and rated along various dimensions, by scholars and, potentially, by others. 
Those tags would consist of digital markers that are electronically associated 
with individual manuscripts.53 The Right to Privacy by Warren and Brandeis, 
for example, could be associated with tags labeled “privacy” and “very high 
quality,” for example (in addition to many others). Online search software 
programmed to search specifically for scholarly publications (such as Google 
Scholar) could include options that permit searching for and sorting results 
according to one or more tags. The result would be a kind of dynamic, 
searchable, shareable, bottom-up post-publication form of peer review. Tags 
could specify subjective characteristics that relate to authority, trustworthiness, 
and quality (“comprehensive,” “advanced,” “introductory”), as well as field, 
subject matter, theoretical orientation, and even more objective criteria, such as 
length, author, publisher, and so on. 
How this gets off the ground is beyond my expertise (in fact, since I’m a 
law professor, most everything is beyond my expertise), but clearly it’s easier 
for a handful of open access archives or even a handful of faculty members to 
get together on this sort of thing than it is for 6,000 law professors to commit to 
revamping the prestige model as a group. Importantly, none of this requires 
cooperation by the law reviews themselves or even substantial initial 
participation by a critical number of faculty, law schools, or universities.54 
SSRN, meet bepress and Paul Caron’s Law Professor Blogs network. Bepress, 
meet SSRN and Law Professor Blogs. This is even the sort of thing that the 
blogosphere may be good at, that is, not in generating scholarship itself, but in 
solving a coordination problem at a very low level. A single faculty blogger 
with the technical skill (or support) to begin to implement the scheme that I’m 
describing could attract enough traffic to get the enterprise off the ground. The 
 
53 For the digerati among you, the proposal is obviously based on social tagging 
systems such as Flickr, http://www.flickr.com/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2006). 
54 Cf. Michael J. Madison, Social Software, Groups, and Governance, 2006 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 153 (describing the virtues of social software in facilitating the emergence of 
informal groups). 
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blogging and short-form “scholarship” that I characterized as cracks in the law 
review foundation may turn out to be precursors of something like this, that is, 
something that clearly feeds the existing economy of prestige, but from outside 
the traditional law review system. If successful, tags for open access 
scholarship (perhaps extending to tags for non-traditional short-form 
scholarship, too) may displace the current economy’s center of gravity, so that 
prestige hums around the distributed tags as much as or even to an extent 
greater than it hums around the journals’ institutional prestige. This summary 
focuses mostly on the law professors’ perspective. It is possible that the same 
thing could work from the reviews’ perspective. Some “tags” could be purely 
descriptive, so that the work is “tagged” with the journal name. Via extension 
of their brands, law reviews themselves would capture the prestige benefits 
they seek.55 By offering scholars a means of re-creating the economy of 
prestige, a disruptive open access model, in other words, has the potential to 
morph into something altogether new, rather than implicit validation of the 
status quo.56 The fact that knowledge may be more widely distributed is a 
happy byproduct of the process. 
VII. 
Can this be right? As I said above, I’m not the first person to frame journal 
publishing or law review publishing in terms of prestige. In his article 
forecasting the demise of law reviews in the face of online self-publishing by 
scholars, Bernard Hibbitts called the prestige argument “specious”: 
“Halo effects” are intellectually suspect—surely serious scholars would 
agree that scholarly articles should ultimately be evaluated on their own 
merits, rather than according to the prestige of the law review in which 
they appear, especially when the law reviews exercise little if any true 
quality control. In this context, eliminating the “halo effect” of placement 
would remove a significant temptation in the way of free and fair 
evaluation of scholarship, while at the same time (re)focusing the 
attention of law professors on doing their scholarly work for its own sake, 
rather than playing the placement game.57 
The idealism is breathtaking. 
If only this were true. In the decade since Hibbitts made this argument, and 
despite the presence of easy-to-use online publishing tools, law professors 
haven’t exactly embraced the idea that what they really want is honest, 
 
       55 Some law review editors have told me recently that they are beginning to look at open 
access publication in precisely this light, so long as authors label their articles with journal 
names. Digital tagging reifies and potentially extends the effect.  
56 A somewhat related model of authoritative electronic publishing defined 
dynamically by the members of a discipline is described in Rob Kling, Lisa Spector & Geoff 
McKim, Locally Controlled Scholarly Publishing Via the Internet: The Guild Model, J. 
ELECTRONIC PUB., Aug. 2002, http://www.press.umich.edu/jep/08-01/kling.html (originally 
published in the Proceedings of the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Society for 
Information Science and Technology). 
57 Hibbitts, supra note 32, at 679. 
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reasoned feedback directly from colleagues. In fact, I suspect that few 
academics really want that sort of thing. The only medium where this sort of 
exchange is occurring today is the expanding blogosphere, which is more and 
more full of law professors engaging in frank, direct dialogues.58 But in the vast 
majority of cases, blogs are not “scholarship,” and some of the most widely-
read law professor bloggers expressly disclaim the idea that what they are 
doing is scholarship.59 (Related to scholarship, yes; actual scholarship, no.) 
Rather, those frank discussions tend to confirm the importance of their target. 
The very openness of blogs confirms both the speciousness and the specialness 
of law review publishing. 
In fact, not only does the economy of prestige model predict that law 
reviews in their present form could not simply be abolished, but it also predicts 
that law reviews (and law schools, and law professors) have little incentive to 
improve the quality of legal scholarship. I’ve said nothing, for example, about 
exchanging publication in student-edited journals for publication in 
(supposedly higher quality) peer-reviewed journals. It’s implicit in what I’ve 
argued that as parts of the economy of prestige, these two selection and 
editorial systems are roughly interchangeable. The law schools finance the law 
reviews with cash, academic credit for students, promotion and tenure 
recognition for faculty, and salaries that support faculty research. Because they 
are underwritten so heavily by the university, law reviews are equipped to 
deliver all the prestige that anyone—at least anyone on a law faculty—needs. 
Most peer-reviewed scholarly journals come from commercial publishers, 
where underwriting comes through the marketplace. Authors and subscribers of 
these journals want prestige, too, but the universities aren’t in a position to 
supply it.60 Faculty depend on grants for research support; peer reviews of 
proposals and of the resulting literature jointly supply the prestige that justifies 
the subscription price.61 In a way, obviously, the two systems resemble each 
other. In each case the economy of prestige ultimately runs through faculty 
offices. That’s not to say that the two systems have the same strengths and 
weaknesses, since they don’t. Law professors have widely varying opinions on 
the merits of law reviews, and some express pretty strong views regarding the 
merits of peer review. But each model, in different ways, is designed to 
 
58 Note that my “tagging” suggestion doesn’t require disclosure of individual reader or 
rater identities; in fact, it might be most effective if participation were limited to law faculty 
but individual identities were omitted by default. 
59 See Social Science Research Network (SSRN), Bloggership: How Blogs are 
Transforming Legal Scholarship, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/JELJOUR_Results.cfm? 
form_name=journalbrowse&journal_id=890371 (last visited Oct. 16, 2006) (archiving 
papers from the April 28, 2006 Bloggership Symposium at Harvard Law School’s Berkman 
Center for Internet & Society). 
60 See Harriet Zuckerman & Robert K. Merton, Patterns of Evaluation in Science: 
Institutionalisation, Structure and Functions of the Referee System, 9 MINERVA 66 (1971). 
61 See Bernard J. Hibbitts, Yesterday Once More: Skeptics, Scribes and the Demise of 
Law Reviews, 30 AKRON L. REV. 267, 294–95 (1996); Bernard Wysocki Jr., Scholarly 
Journals’ Premier Status Is Diluted by Web, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2005, at A1. 
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generate and maintain the kind of prestige that scholars crave.62 Open access is 
consistent or inconsistent with either one in equal measure, or least on the same 
terms that I’ve argued apply to journals generally. I don’t need to take a 
position on the merits of peer review, but it strikes me as unlikely that the law 
schools will get out of the journal business any time soon. Inertia is a powerful 
thing. Law professors are unlikely to be willing to shoulder the real burdens of 
peer review, especially if a new version of the prestige economy can emerge at 
lower cost. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
I suggested at the outset that this piece was really about open access in 
general, and only about law reviews in particular, rather than vice versa. I want 
to deliver on that suggestion. Does the economy of prestige theory have 
anything to say about the one scholarly community that seems to have whole-
heartedly embraced open access principles for its scholarship, which is 
physics? The physicists’ arcXiv.org open access e-print archive has co-existed 
peacefully with proprietary physics journals for 15 years.63 The community of 
physics scholars and commercial physics journals hasn’t collapsed. Why not? If 
the economy of prestige theory is right, and if I’ve applied it correctly to law 
professors and law reviews, then there must be some relevant differences 
between physicists and lawyers, and maybe we can use those differences to 
sketch some predictions regarding the likely success of open access efforts in 
other fields. It’s possible, for example, that physicists don’t care much about 
prestige. That seems doubtful. Or, open access publishing has supplemented the 
existing physicists’ economy of prestige with a prestige dimension of its own. 
(In other words, for example, open access may be so cool in the physics 
departments that everyone has to get with the program.) I doubt that, too. Or, 
still, physicists may get their prestige (and their funding) in some way other 
than the disciplinary validation and self-congratulation that follows scholarly 
publication, as in law. 
My intuition is that this third hypothesis is the strongest one,64 and here’s 
why. If you’re really unlocking the secrets of the universe, then you sleep 
 
62 Zuckerman and Merton characterize the issue slightly differently; they describe it as 
“authority.” See Zuckerman & Merton, supra note 60, at 95–96. That’s not quite the same 
thing as prestige, but it’s pretty close, and the constructedness of both shows that peer-
review and student-edited law school publishing are designed basically to accomplish the 
same thing, in very different ways. Berring, supra note 48, and Schauer, supra note 48, 
complete the circle by talking about mechanisms of authority for legal literature. 
Descriptions of the declining role of traditional legal authority in judicial decision-making 
reflect anxiety over the singular position of legal scholarship. See Frederick Schauer & 
Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal Information, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1080 (1997); 
Michael D. McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical 
Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998). 
63 See Kling et al., supra note 3. 
64 Rob Kling and his colleagues suggest something similar in their comparison of the 
social locations of physicists and physicians, and the development of PubMed Central. See 
id. Their focus, however, is on institutional structure, not symbolic or cognitive structures. 
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pretty soundly at night. The exception, in other words, proves the rule. The 
economy of prestige assumes a constructed universe, a universe of cultural 
goods. Physics research isn’t just a cultural good. Physics knowledge is 
constructed along with everything else, but it’s constructed at such a deep level 
that our ordinary selves, and physicists most of all, don’t see it that way. So it’s 
good in itself in a way that “legal scholarship” really isn’t. Physicists—who 
are, after all, smarter than lawyers—get this. Open access flourishes for them 
because they know that their brass ring isn’t tenure and a spot at the university 
that exempts them from representing real clients with real problems and 
delivering real results. Their brass ring is the Grand Unified Theory of 
Everything. 
This distinction is obviously more spectrum than either/or. Modeling legal 
scholarship as an economy of prestige implies that the made dominates the true, 
but scholars of all kinds want to be right as well as respected.65 Does this 
slightly more refined idea of the law review, sharpened by contrast with 
scholarship in at least one salient discipline, tell us something that we can use 
to understand where and how to best operationalize open access? Legal 
scholarship isn’t quite so important in the scheme of things, but scholars do 
care about the distribution of legal knowledge, even if it’s often made up. 
If I truly knew the answer to that question, then maybe I really could get 
published in the Harvard Law Review (which would be great!), so all I can do 
here is speculate a little bit. I think that the answer is yes. Maybe open access 
works for knowledge goods that have intrinsic value and not for knowledge 
goods that don’t. Maybe the law reviews’ reluctance to adopt open access 
policies and law professors’ reluctance to seek out open access publication is a 
kind of jurisprudential clue. If law professors really want open access to take 
hold in legal scholarship, then they—that is, we—should take empiricism more 
seriously than we often do. Or, if we want to keep up our (and my) pose of 
reflective self-absorption, we need the justification and prestige that the current 
publishing system supplies. I’m not confident that we can have it both ways. 
Making open access work in any context requires understanding a cultural 
economy. If open access doesn’t challenge that economy, the two can co-exist, 
side-by-side. That’s the model that I see in physics. Maybe open access 
undermines that economy. That’s the threat that legal scholars and law reviews 
(and, I suspect, scholars and journals in a lot of fields) currently perceive. For 
cultural goods, the best hope for open access advocates may be to promote and 
build out a system in which the cultural economy incorporates and capitalizes 
on open access, giving the publishing platform a viable justification in 
recognizable cultural terms. This isn’t a Field of Dreams; if you build it, they 
won’t come. Open access tools and other resources must be designed so that 
they get taken up in the existing economic framework. If that new system 
operates from the outside in, becoming embedded in the economy, then it has 
the potential to subvert that economy from the inside out, starting from its 
 
65 See Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 
80 CAL. L. REV. 889, 911–13 (1992). 
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embedded position. Who knows if that will ever happen? But if it does, the 
distribution of knowledge that is the real idea of open access might be realized. 
 
